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Abstract: Attaining high quality in security requirements specification requires first-rate 
professional expertise, which is scarce. In fact, most organisations do not include core security 
experts in their software team. This scenario motivates the need for adequate tool support for 
security requirements specification so that the human requirements analyst can be assisted to 
specify security requirements of acceptable quality with minimum effort. This paper presents a 
tool-based semantic framework that uses ontology and requirements boilerplates to facilitate 
the formulation and specification of security requirements. A two-phased evaluation of the 
semantic framework suggests that it is usable, leads to reduction of effort, aids the quick 
discovery of hidden security threats, and improves the quality of security requirements. 
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1 Introduction 
The advent of the Internet and virtual environments that afford systems integration 
and collaboration among remotely based systems has increased the importance of 
security considerations when developing software systems. Security requirements 
specification entails the formal documentation of identified security needs of a system 
in order to ensure the development of secure information systems. However, attaining 
good quality in security requirements specification requires first-rate professional 
expertise, which is scarce. There is a lack of security experts or security requirements 
engineers in many organizations.  This is because most requirements engineers have 
had no training in identifying, analysing, specifying, and managing security 
requirements (SR) [Firesmith 04; Salini 11]. Hence, when security requirements are 
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defined, they are often either too vague or overly specific in constraining designers to 
use particular mechanisms [Firesmith 04]. This scenario motivates the provision of 
tool-based support for security requirements specification. The tool-based support 
will: 1) assist the requirements analyst  (subsequently  referred to as analyst) to 
identify security threats, which is usually a manual procedure in which the quality of 
SR depends on the expertise of the human personnel; 2) stimulate the adoption of 
appropriate defence strategies to deal with the identified security threats; 3) enable the 
formulation of SR in a consistent way, minimizing ambiguity, and enhancing 
correctness of SR; and 4) reduce the effort needed for security requirements 
specification by allowing the reuse of previously specified SR in subsequent 
instances. The overriding aim is to complement the capabilities of the analyst in the 
task of security requirements specification so that the quality of SR is improved and 
the amount of human effort reduced.   
In order to realize this aim, we have adopted a semantic-based approach that uses 
an integration of ontologies and requirements boilerplates to complement the 
activities of the analyst during security requirements specification. A requirement 
boilerplate is a predefined textual template that can guide the way requirements are 
written so that a consistent pattern can be maintained when writing structurally 
similar requirements [Hull 04]. The use of ontologies provides the necessary 
background knowledge, and domain knowledge that is required to identify security 
threats, and recommend appropriate countermeasures, while the requirements 
boilerplates provide a reusable template for writing SR in a consistent way in order to 
minimize ambiguity.  Relative to previous approaches, the main contribution of this 
work is the provision of an elaborate semantic-based procedure that enables the tool-
assisted formulation of SR in a way that enhances quality, and reduces effort needed 
to formulate SR.  This is because our approach: 1) enables identification of security 
threats from security threat description scenarios; 2) provides recommendation of 
defence actions as countermeasure to identified security threats; and 3) enables 
pattern-based reuse of requirements boilerplates when writing SR. 
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of contextual 
background and related work, while Section 3 presents our approach. Section 4 
discusses the evaluation, results and threats to validity. The paper is concluded in 
Section 5 with a discussion of further work. 
2 Background and Related Work 
In this section, we provide background information on security requirements 
engineering (SRE), application of ontologies to SRE, and the use of boilerplates for 
security requirements specification.  Additionally, we discuss related work. 
2.1 Security Requirements Engineering (SRE) 
A requirement is "a condition or capability that must be met by the system to solve a 
problem or achieve an objective" [IEEE Std. 98]. Requirements engineering is a 
systematic process to elicit, analyse, specify, validate, and manage such requirements 
[Kotonya & Sommerville 98]. Security requirements engineering (SRE) can then be 
defined as requirements engineering specifically targeting the elicitation, 
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specification, analysis, validation and management of security requirements, where 
security can be understood as the ability of the system to cope with malicious attacks, 
ensuring confidentiality, integrity and availability of system data and functions. SRE 
is designed to ensure early consideration of probable security concerns when 
developing secure software systems. It aims to integrate the security needs of a 
system particularly from the attacker’s perspective into the software development 
process as early as possible. According to [Chandrabrose 11], security requirements 
objectives can be categorized as authentication, authorization, integrity, intrusion 
detection, non-repudiation, confidentiality, and auditing. Some of the most well-
known SRE approaches are described as follows. 
 
i) Comprehensive, Lightweight Application Security Process (CLASP)  
 The CLASP approach [Viega 05; Graham 06] is a life-cycle process that suggests a 
number of different activities across the software development life cycle to improve 
security. The key steps of the CLASP approach are: 1) identify system roles and 
resources; 2) categorize resources into abstractions; 3) identify resource interactions 
through the lifetime of the system; 4) for each category, specify mechanisms for 
addressing each core security services. The CLASP handles security requirements by 
performing a structured walkthrough of resources, and determining how they address 
each core security service throughout the lifetime of that resource [Graham 06]. 
 
ii) System Quality Requirements Engineering (SQUARE)  
SQUARE is a requirements engineering methodology for eliciting, categorizing, 
and prioritizing security requirements for information technology systems and 
applications [Mead 05]. The process consists of nine steps performed in a 
sequential order by a team of requirements engineers, including at least one 
expert in risk assessment methods, and project stakeholders.  The steps are: 1) 
agree on definitions; 2) identify assets and goals; 3) develop supporting artifacts; 
4) perform risk assessment; 5) select elicitation technique; 6) elicit security 
requirements; 7) categorize requirements; 8) prioritize requirements; 9) inspect 
requirements. SQUARE is performed at the requirements elicitation stage of the 
development life cycle to develop security-related system requirements. By 
guiding stakeholders and requirements engineers through the specification of 
security requirements, SQUARE ensures that security is addressed early in the 
project life cycle in the same way as functional attributes and other quality 
attributes [Salini 11].  
 
iii) The Security Requirements Engineering Process (SREP)  
SREP [Mellado 07] is based partially on SQUARE but incorporates consideration of 
the Common Criteria [Common Criteria, 99] - an international standard (ISO/IEC 
15408) for computer security certification - and notions of reuse. SREP is quite 
similar to SQUARE [Salini 11]. It is a nine-step process consisting of the following 
activities: 1) agree on definitions; 2) identify vulnerable and/or critical assets; 3) 
identify security objectives and dependencies; 4) identify threats and develop 
artifacts; 5) risk assessment; 6) elicit security requirements; 7) categorize and 
prioritize requirements; 8) requirements inspection; and 9) repository improvement.  
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iv) Secure Tropos  
Secure Tropos [Mouratidis 04] is a methodology that is based on the i*-modelling 
framework for agent-oriented software development. It extends the Tropos 
methodology [Yu 01], by including concepts for modelling the security aspects of 
systems. The additional concepts introduced to Secure Tropos are:  security 
constraint, secure dependency, and secure entity. Thus, the Secure Tropos process 
also extends the Tropos process with phases to analyze and model the new concepts. 
These activities produce different kinds of diagrams, which are used as input to the 
later activities. The activities are: security reference modelling, security constraint 
modelling, and secure capabilities modelling [Mouratidis 04].  
 
v)  The CORAS Method 
CORAS [Braber, 07] is a UML-based method for model-based security analysis that 
is originally inspired by the notion of misuse cases. The misuse case (MUC) models 
the various ways in which the activities of a malicious user can be a threat to a 
system. It is consist of a diagram model – called MUC, and textual equivalent called 
the textual misuse case (TMUC). The MUC is an extension of the regular Use Case 
(UC) diagram with new additional concepts such as misusers, misuse cases and 
mitigation use cases in order to elicit the security requirements of a system [Sindre 
05]. CORAS is a seven steps process that provides a customized language for threat 
and risk modeling and has a detailed guide on how the language should be used to 
capture and model relevant information during the security analysis. CORAS methods 
provides a computational tool designed to support documenting, maintaining and 
reporting analysis results through risk modeling, table-based documentation, 
consistency checking and more. The seven steps of CORAS are: 1) Introduction; 2) 
high level analysis; 3) approval of target description; 4) risk identification; 5) risk 
estimation; 6) risk evaluation, and 7) risk treatment. 
2.2 Application of Ontologies to SRE 
Ontology is a shared formal conceptualization of a domain that allows definition of 
semantic relationships between entities, and inference of knowledge through 
reasoning at run-time [Happel 10]. Ontologies have an important role to play in SRE. 
Research efforts on security ontologies such as [Fenz 09; Herzog 07; Kim 05] attest to 
this. In [Donner 03] the use of ontology was suggested as the solution to the problem 
of vaguely defined vocabularies among security practitioners.  
According to [Souag 12], specific applications of ontology to SRE include: 
(i) Security taxonomies – this are concept hierarchies of security terms and 
concepts.  
(ii) General security Ontologies – this contains definition of all aspects of security 
such as assets, threats, and vulnerabilities. They are knowledge infrastructures 
that are created to support SRE activities such as threat modelling and security 
risk analysis. 
(iii) Specific security ontologies – this have been developed to support specific 
security activities such as intrusion detection, computer network attack, and 
system vulnerabilities. 
(iv) Security ontologies for Semantic Web – this have been developed for the 
security of semantic web resources such as software agents, and web services.  
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(v) Security ontologies for risk analysis – this are designed for the analysis of 
industrial risk that are associated with identified security threats. 
(vi) Ontologies for security requirements – this supports the definition of security 
requirements. 
Generally, a good ontology will facilitate more effective reporting of incidents, 
sharing of information, and interoperable security collaborations among different 
organizations. Our proposed framework uses ontology to ensure the standardization of 
vocabulary in security requirements specification, threat identification, and the 
recommendation of appropriate countermeasure to identified threats. 
2.3 Boilerplates for Security Requirements 
The notion of requirements boilerplates (RB) which stems originally from the work of 
[Hull 04], and subsequently applied in [Daramola 11] enables the writing of 
requirements in a consistent manner. A requirement boilerplate is a pre-defined 
structural template for writing requirement statements. It imposes a uniform structure 
on the way requirements are written, by affording a level of expressivity akin to using 
natural language, yet minimising ambiguity in requirement statements. The fixed 
parts of requirement boilerplate are reused when writing requirements, while the 
analyst can fill in the parameter parts manually.  
An example of a boilerplate taken from the webpage1 is: 
 
“BP2: The <system> shall be able to <action> <entity>” 
  
Here, BP2 is the label of this particular boilerplate. The terms in < > brackets are 
parameters where something must be filled in when the boilerplate is instantiated to a 
concrete requirement. The words that are outside brackets are the fixed syntax 
elements (FSE) that will be kept as-is when the boilerplate is instantiated. An example 
of an instantiation of this particular boilerplate, would be "The Internet banking  
system shall be able to authenticate all its users". In this case <action> has been 
replaced by “authenticate” and <entity> by “all its users”. In some cases, several 
boilerplates may be combined to make precise and testable requirements, e.g. 
combining BP2 with BP37 ...at least <percentage> of the time will yield the 
requirement "The Internet banking system shall be able to authenticate all users at 
least 99.99% of the  time".  
Thus, the use of boilerplate will ensure that a unified structure and style of 
writing is used for requirements that pertain to specific classes of system function, 
capability, goals, or constraints. The FSE in each boilerplate will remain the same for 
all requirements that used a certain boilerplate. For instance, all who used BP2 + 
BP37 to specify that the system should be able to do something with some specific 
frequency, will now use phrases "shall be able to", "at least", "times per", rather than 
various other phrases that could have more or less the same meaning, e.g., "have the 
ability to", "be capable of", "a minimum of", "more than", "shots per", etc. 
Therefore, using boilerplates will: i) facilitate the reuse of parts of the 
requirements text (viz. the FSE), as well as hints what should be filled in for 
parameters; (ii) help to attain better quality of requirements, e.g., BP35 reminding 
                                                           
1 http://www.requirementsboilerplates.org 
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analysts that one should be precise about the required frequency of some action, thus 
encouraging more quantification of requirements, which is vital for testability (viz. 
using boilerplates as preliminary basis for requirements checking); and (iii) lead to 
completeness of the specification, e.g., looking at the boilerplates available, the 
analyst or domain expert might be reminded of requirements that they would 
otherwise have forgotten to specify (viz. using the boilerplates catalogue as a 
checklist). 
Boilerplates could also be applied to security requirements (SR), and it is possible 
to integrate the formulated boilerplates with a security-related ontology for specifying 
SR. In [Firesmith 05], Firesmith provided a foundation for the mapping of specific 
security requirements to the types of defence actions to address them. He identified 
four different types of defence against security threats, which can be used to assign 
specific security threats to the types of defence actions to counter them.  These are: 
(i) Prevention of malicious harm, security incident, security threats and security 
risks. 
(ii) Detection of malicious attack, security incidents, security threats, and security 
risks. 
(iii) Reaction to detected malicious attack. 
(iv) Adaptation of system to avoid or minimize the negative consequences of the 
malicious harm, security incidents, security threats and security risks. This 
could also be in terms of recovery of system from attacks. 
For each of the defence types, Firesmith also gave specific examples. 
The examples in [Firesmith 05], could be the basis for some generic SR 
boilerplates, e.g. 
SecBP1: The <system> should [prevent | detect] at least <percentage> of <harm | 
incident | threat | risk> 
SecBP2: Upon detection of <harm | incident | threat | risk> the system shall 
<action> 
SecBP11:  ...of attacks with maximum duration <number> <time unit> 
SecBP12:  ...made by attackers with profile <attacker profile> 
SecBP21: ...at least <[0-100]>% of the time 
Here, SecBP11, SecBP12, and SecBP21 are parts that could be optionally 
concatenated with SecBP1 or SecBP2 respectively.  
The use of boilerplates for security requirements specification in practical terms 
will involve formulating requirement boilerplates for the different aspects of security 
such as authentication, authorization, integrity, intrusion detection, non-repudiation, 
confidentiality, and auditing. Therefore, more boilerplates could be formulated, both 
as core parts and as attachments, but since boilerplates for security will vary for 
different domains, we cannot go into more detail here. However, experienced 
personnel must create the boilerplates prior to security requirements specification as 
an upfront investment, while it should be updated periodically as new types of 
requirements emerge. By so doing, the boilerplate repository becomes an 
organisational asset for security requirements specification that can be useful when 
there is paucity of experienced security requirements analyst personnel. 
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2.4  Extending Boilerplates with Ontologies 
It is possible to use boilerplates without any ontology, and the originators of 
boilerplates did not propose any ontology extension. Without ontologies, the 
boilerplates will still be useful in providing reuse of at least the FSE, and probably 
some quality increase by writing requirements in a fixed style, where one is reminded 
of the need to quantify requirements where possible. Extending the boilerplates with 
ontologies gives some extra advantages, such as allowing the validation of terms and 
relationships that are contained in requirements to ensure they are used correctly and 
acceptably in the domain concerned [Daramola 12]. For example, pertaining to the 
parameterized parts in italics in the boilerplate examples above (SecBP1), where the 
analysts themselves have to fill in numbers, single words or phrases  in the boilerplate 
requirements, an ontology could be developed based on standards documents for that 
domain. The domain ontology will ensure that whenever the analyst fills in a word or 
phrase denoting some recognized concept from the ontology, say "ACC" (Automatic 
Cruise Controller) in the case of developing automotive software, the support tool 
could search for the concept ACC in the domain ontology, and - if finding it - know 
(i) whether there are any other terms which might be synonyms for this, and thus 
discover relationships between requirements that would not easily have been 
discovered otherwise, because of  different terminology used; (ii) what other 
components are closely related to the ACC; and (iii) what various security levels is 
typically required of ACC, etc. Similarly, for other domains, e.g., aviation, one would 
have definitions of relevant concepts there, like flight, plane, pilot, runway, tower, etc. 
stored in a domain ontology.  Hence, to put it simply, if just using boilerplates without 
ontologies, the analysts mainly get help with reusing the FSE (bold phrases) of 
examples like those above, but are left on their own with the parameters (italics) to fill 
the brackets. With ontologies there is help also with ensuring consistent use of 
language, discovering requirements that are related to each other because they address 
the same or closely related concepts or procedures in the system, etc. Hence, a tool 
platform that enables the leveraging of domain knowledge via an ontology, and use of 
boilerplates will be potentially useful to a requirements analyst in the process of 
security requirements specification. 
2.5 Related Work 
We shall approach our review of related work from two perspectives. First we shall 
consider the recent approaches of ontology-based frameworks for security and 
second, the aspect of tool support for security requirements engineering (SRE).  
Recent approaches of ontology-based frameworks for security include [Lasheras 
et al., 2009], where an ontology framework for reusing security requirements during 
requirements specification was presented. The work involved the creation of a risk 
analysis ontology and requirement ontology which are combined to represent reusable 
security requirements, and improve the detection of incomplete and inconsistent 
requirements, and also semantic processing in requirements analysis. It was an 
extensible framework that provided basis for a lightweight method to elicit, and 
specify security requirements, based on security standards. The framework is 
typically a combination of ontologies that will be useful to ontology experts who are 
not experienced  in security issues. However, the work was not focussed on detecting 
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security threats from textual sources as done in our own approach, neither was it a 
tool-based framework. [Chikh et al., 2011] proposed a framework for information 
security requirements (ISRs) using ontologies. The framework enables ISRs 
traceability and reuse based on three kinds of generic ontologies – software 
requirement ontology, application domain ontology, and information security 
ontology.  The work proposed the design of an ontology-based information security 
requirements engineering framework, which supports analysts in building and 
managing their ISRs by leveraging the three ontologies. The authors anticipated that 
the proposal will help requirements engineers to create and understand the ISRs. The 
work was strictly a proposal that did not include any implementation or evaluation.  
[Massacci et al., 2011] presented an amalgamated and extended ontology for 
modelling security requirements. The extended ontology integrates the existing 
concepts from the Problem Frames and Secure i* methodologies in order to realize a 
more complete basis for modelling security requirements due to missing constructs in 
the individual approaches. The expressiveness of the proposed extended ontology was 
tested by modelling the security requirements of a case study from the Air Traffic 
Management domain. Similarly, [Blanco et al., 2011] after conducting a systematic 
review of existing proposals,  proposed a basis for an integrated and united security 
ontology since existing security ontologies seem to focus on specific domains. They 
identified three key requirements that an integrated security ontology should consider, 
which are static knowledge - which will allow the concepts collected in the ontology 
to be properly identified; dynamic knowledge – which will ensure that the knowledge 
collected in the ontology can be used to infer other knowledge; and reusability - 
which will ensure the fact that the ontology is developed by taking into consideration 
aspects that permit its reuse and shareability. The tool-based orientation of our 
approach is a deviation from existing ontology-based frameworks for security, in that 
it targets real-time support for the requirements analyst during security requirements 
specification. It leverages ontology and a template-based approach –boilerplates - for 
both the elicitation and formulation of security requirements from textual sources in 
order to reduce effort and enhance quality. 
In terms of tool support for SRE, we shall classify tool for SRE into two broad 
categories – front-end tools and back-end tools. Front-end tools and approaches are 
those that facilitate the elicitation, modelling, and analysis of security threats in order 
to derive SR, while the back-end tools are those that help with the specification and 
validation of SR, and their integration with other requirements. Notable examples of 
front-end tools include: SecTro [Pavlidis 12], - a CASE tool that supports automated 
modelling and analysis of security requirements based on the Secure Tropos 
approach. The ST-Tool [Giorgini 05] supports the Secure Tropos methodology. Its 
main goals are to support the translation of Secure Tropos models into formal 
specifications, and serve as a front-end tool for formal analysis of Secure Tropos 
models. The jMUCMNav editor (Java Use Case Map Navigator), [Bizhanzadeh 11] is 
a modelling tool for Misuse Case Maps (MUCMs) in designing secure architectures 
for business processes. jUCMNav simply focuses on modelling for use case maps 
(UCM) and supports all UCM notations. Other front-end SRE tools that are worth 
mentioning are SeaMonster [Tøndel 10; SeaMonster 07], and Suraksha security 
workbench [Maurya 09].  
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Currently, there are more front-end tools than back-end tools for SRE. The 
SQUARE tool [Mead 05] is a back-end managerial tool that is designed to increase 
the quality of SRE process for the adopters of the SQUARE methodology. It supports 
core SRE aspects such as definitions, searching, and addition of new terms, 
identification of security goals, assets and privacy goals, performing risk assessment, 
identifying threats, prioritizing requirements, traceability, and exporting of 
requirements to other requirements management tool. Similarly, the prototype tool - 
ReqSec tool – that we have developed is an eclipse-based back-end tool that supports 
security requirements specification, and enables the integration of SR with other types 
of requirements. The unique feature of the ReqSec tool compared to other SRE back-
end tools stems from its capability to facilitate automatic analysis of natural language 
requirements in order to assist the analyst during security requirements specification. 
It represents a first attempt to use semantic-based procedures for supporting both 
security threat identification and security requirements specification. In the wider 
requirements engineering context, approaches such as [Gleich 10] – ambiguity 
detection-,   [Wilson 97; Fabrini 01] – requirement quality assessment-, are also based 
on natural language (NL) text analysis but did not use ontologies. The DODT 
[Farfeleder 11] tool does not have a focus for SRE, but it bears similarity with our 
approach, because it combines the use of ontologies and boilerplates to enable semi-
automatic transformation of NL requirements into boilerplate requirements. However, 
it can only ensure the correctness of requirements based on the underlying domain 
ontology, and the writing of boilerplate requirements. Our approach does more, in that 
it entails the discovery of latent security threats contained in NL descriptions, and the 
recommendation of probable defence actions that aids the formulation of semi-formal 
boilerplate SR.  Hence, the novelty of our approach is the provision of a backend tool 
for SRE that will minimize effort needed for security requirements specification, and 
offer a credible starting point for security requirements specification, particularly in 
cases where there is paucity of experienced personnel. 
3 Overview of the Semantic Approach 
A high-level schematic overview of our semantic approach is presented in Figure 1. 
The process starts with input of description of the security threat scenario, which 
should be represented as a textual Misuse Case (TMUC) [Sindre, 05]. This is 
followed by identification of type of attack and required defence action through 
semantic text analysis of the TMUC, thereafter suggestion of boilerplates to be used 
to the analyst, and finally specification of security requirements by the analyst. In 
sequel sections, we present a typical example of the description of a security threat 
described using a TMUC, and the description of the different activity steps of our 
semantic framework. 
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Figure 1: Activity Workflow of the tool-assisted SR Specification Process 
3.1 Database Tampering - Example 
In order to demonstrate how our tool-based framework can be applied, we hereby 
consider the example of a security threat description of database tampering scenario. 
The detail of the scenario is presented in Table 1 using a TMUC template. 
 
Table 1: TMUC for Database Tampering Case 
 
Code: QC1  
Misuse Case 
Title 
Tamper with database by web query manipulation
Name of 
System 
Web Query System
Summary A crook manipulates the web query, submitted from a search form, 
to update or delete information, or to reveal confidential 
information; 
Basic Path The crook provides some values on a product search form and 
submits. The system displays the product(s) matching the query. 
The crook alters the submitted URL, introducing a query error, and 
resubmits. The query fails and the system displays the database 
error message to the crook, revealing more about the database 
structure. The crook alters the query further, for instance adding a 
nested query to reveal secret data or update or delete data, and 
submits. The system executes the altered query, changing the 
database or revealing content that should have been secret. 
Alternative 
Path 
The crook does not alter the URL in the address window, but 
introduces errors or nested queries directly into form input fields. 
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3.2 Input TMC details 
The TMUC template [Sindre, 05] has two core aspects namely the basic path, and the 
alternative path. The basic path describes the security threat scenario that could be 
used by an attacker to cause harm to a system, while the alternative path specifies the 
other options that may be explored by an attacker or user with malicious intent. These 
two aspects together with the TMUC summary provide the key inputs used to identify 
the type of attack, and required defence for the system. 
3.3 Identify Type of Attack 
We used information extraction techniques to identify the type of attack described by 
a TMUC template. The textual input was semantically analysed in order to identify 
and extract the theme words. A theme word can be the subject of a sentence (noun), 
or an action word (verbs) or a word collocation that connote a security threat to a 
system. The knowledge that is captured in the definition of basic threat ontology 
(BTO) (see Figure 2), WordNet ontology, and the domain ontology (DO) are used to 
facilitate the identification of theme words. Core procedures for semantic analysis of 
natural language text such as tokenization, parts-of-speech tagging, syntax parsing, 
morphological analysis, and ontology-based inferencing were implemented by using 
algorithms that based on the Stanford NLP toolkit2, Word Net java API, and the Jena 
semantic framework3. 
3.4  Determine the Type of Defence using the Basic Threat Ontology (BTO)  
The BTO contains a mapping of different kinds of security threats to specific defence 
actions based on information that was gathered from the literature and a number of 
existing security ontologies. The BTO is a major investment and a core knowledge 
infrastructure of the framework. The defence actions are the ones proposed by 
Firesmith in [Firesmith 05]. We reused all the essential aspects of the threat 
description in Security Ontology [Herzog 07] as foundation for developing the BTO, 
which included some additional concepts. The BTO has a total of 98 classes, 46 
restrictions and 9 object properties. The key object properties include hasDefense – 
which associates a threat with a specific defensive action, hasThreat – which 
associate a threat with an asset, isThreathenedBy – inverse of hasThreat, isThreatTo, 
isSameAs, - which describes equivalent concepts. Each security threat in the BTO was 
mapped to one or more defence actions (viz. detect, prevent, adapt, react, recover) 
using the hasDefense object property. Figure 2, presents a view of the BTO 
illustrating how specific types of attacks have been mapped to corresponding defence 
actions.  The knowledge contained in the BTO is used for automatic recommendation 
of appropriate defence actions when a particular type of attack has been identified 
from the TMUC input details. The Pellet OWL Descriptive Logics (DL) reasoner was 
used as the ontology reasoning engine for the BTO.  
 
 
                                                           
2
 http://nlp.stanford.edu/software/lex-parser.shtml 
3 http://jena.sourceforge.net/ 
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Figure 2: A view of the description of Malformed Input threat in the BTO using 
OntoViz 
3.5  Suggestion of Relevant Boilerplates 
The output of the information extraction process is a list of recommendations 
comprising a set of defence-action and attack-type pairs R (see Figure 3) such that: 
 R= {r1, r2, ..., rn} i.e.  ri = <d, t>   
Here d is a defence-action and t is a specific type of attack that has been identified. 
For example: 
<detect> <eavesdropping> 
 <prevent> <code Injection> 
   ... etc. 
The recommended pairs are derived by combining the relevant theme words that 
were extracted from a particular TMUC description and specific attack types (threat 
concepts) that are described in the BTO. A theme word will be considered relevant to 
a particular security threat scenario if any of the following rules are true [Daramola 
12]:  
(i) if the theme word syntactically matches an existing BTO threat concept;  
(ii) if the theme word in its root form (lemma) can be associated with a BTO threat 
concept;  
(iii) if the theme word is either a synonym, hyponym, or hypernym of a BTO 
threat concepts; and  
(iv) if a BTO threat concepts is a sub-concept of a concept already identified by 
any of (i) - (iii).  
In cases when the theme word is not a single word (e.g. phrase), the head word – that 
which is most significant to the meaning – is selected and used in the inference rules.   
The corresponding defence action for an identified type of attack is inferred by 
exploring the set of pre-defined mappings of specific threats to defence actions that 
are specified in the BTO. The analysis of theme words to determine their different 
word forms is enabled by the using the WordNet ontology and the WordNet Java API, 
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while the Pellet OWL Descriptive Logic reasoner was used to facilitate ontology 
reasoning on the axioms and concepts of the BTO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: A snapshot of suggestions for database tampering from the tool 
3.6  Formulation of Security Requirements and Reuse of Boilerplates for 
Security Requirements Specification 
Beside the suggestion of boilerplates, the semantic framework aids the requirements 
analyst during the formulation of SR by facilitating the reuse of existing boilerplates 
that are been used previously. The activities of tool-assisted SR formulation and reuse 
of boilerplate for security requirements specification are described as follows. 
3.6.1 SR Formulation 
At the start of the security requirements specification process, when no requirements 
have been specified, the analyst will have to select a specific <defence-action, attack-
type> option from the list of recommendations, and from the boilerplate repository, 
must select a core boilerplate, and optionally select, a prefix, or suffix or both. For 
example, when the analyst, selects SecBP1(core boilerplate), and SecBP21 (suffix) 
[see Section 2.3] and highlights a recommended <defence-action, attack-type> option 
say “<prevent, Code Injection>”, the resulting boilerplate SR would have keywords 
“prevent” and “Code Injection” already inserted in the right places as below: 
The <system> should prevent at least <[0-100]>% of Code Injection at least < 
[0-100]>% of the time 
For each SR formulation, the fixed syntax elements (FSE) in the selected 
boilerplate, prefix, and suffix are reused, while the selected <defence-action, attack-
type> substitutes the <action> placeholder in the selected boilerplate. The analyst can 
then fill in the remaining part – marked with “< >” - of the boilerplate requirements 
that require specific data to complete the SR formulation. While completing the 
remaining part, data that can be inferred from knowledge contained in the underlying 
DO e.g. the specific system name for <system> are also suggested to the analyst.  In 
this way, the analyst can save some effort, attain consistency, completeness, and 
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correct use of domain vocabulary, which ultimately improves the quality of specified 
SR.   
3.6.2 Reuse of Requirement Boilerplates for SR 
The tool is able to learn as the analyst selects specific requirement boilerplates and 
uses them to formulate SR. It keeps track of the frequency of use of each requirement 
boilerplate and maintains an updated count of each one. When the analyst has 
completed the formulation of few SR (two or more), the relevant requirement 
boilerplate patterns that tend to be more used are displayed in a ranked order as 
probable candidates to be reused for a new SR formulation [Daramola 12]. The search 
process for relevant requirement boilerplates to reuse entails looking at all previously 
used requirements boilerplate patterns that contains the keyword specified in the 
highlighted  recommended <defence action, <attack type> option and ranking them 
based on their frequency of usage. For example if  the recommended option “prevent  
Code Injection” is highlighted by the analyst,  a ranked list of auto-generated 
requirements boilerplate patterns – combinations of boilerplate core parts, prefix, and 
suffix, that contains the keywords “prevent” that have been previously used are 
displayed as candidates to reuse in a new SR formulation.  With this, the analyst is 
able to find reusable requirement boilerplates quicker, and avoids having to look 
through the complete set of boilerplates – core parts, prefix, and suffix in the 
boilerplate repository before composing a SR. This way, the analyst can save some 
effort by using the tool to specify SR.  
4 Evaluation 
In order to assess the semantic framework, we have conducted evaluation in two 
phases. In the first phase, we assessed the usability of the tool-based semantic 
framework to support security requirements specification. We conducted a 
preliminary evaluation by using a controlled experiment with seven subjects. The 
subjects were Master degree students of software engineering of NTNU, Norway, 
who volunteered to participate in the experiment. The participants were paid for 
taking part in the experiment. The second phase of evaluation focussed on assessing 
the quality of security requirements that were specified by participants in the first 
evaluation. To do this, we requested experienced requirements analysts who have 
ample experience of working with security requirements to assess the quality of the 
SR specified by the participants of the first evaluation that used the tool-based 
semantic framework.  
4.1  First Evaluation 
4.1.1 Background of Participants 
An assessment of the background of participants through a pre-experiment 
questionnaire revealed that the participants had good background knowledge in the 
specific areas such as system security, requirements engineering, ontology, and 
boilerplates that pertain to the experiment. They have all taken two relevant courses – 
TDT4237 Software security and TDT4242 Requirements engineering and testing at 
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the NTNU, Norway. In addition, the majority of the subjects also claimed to have 
some industrial work experience, although the majority only as part time positions or 
summer internships while studying. 
4.1.2 Evaluation Procedure 
The participants were asked to use the Reqsec tool4 during a controlled experiment 
that lasted for 1.5 hours. They were presented with four security threat scenarios – 
TMUC- in four different domains. The TMUC deals with: (i) Air Traffic Control 
System – fabrication of false clearance; (ii) Electronic Passport System – identity 
theft of card holder; (iii) Network Security Bridge – hacking of network host 
computer; (iv) Database Tampering - manipulation of web query. All the participants 
performed the same task at any given time during the experiment. The participants 
were given a five minutes tutorial on the use of the tool5 before they commenced the 
experiment. They were required to assess the tool along six dimensions - perceived 
usefulness (PU), perceived ease of use (PEOU), intention to use (ITU), reuse (reu), 
accuracy (acc), and serendipity (sere) - through a post-experiment questionnaire that 
was based on a 5-point Likert scale. The mean scores out of a maximum of 5.0 for 
each of the six dimensions are shown in Table 1. 
4.1.3 Results 
The analysis of the results from the post-experiment questionnaire revealed that the 
tool had its highest mean rating in the aspects of perceived ease of use (PU), and 
serendipity (sere) – the users acknowledged that the tool offered suggestions that they 
had not thought about originally. The tool also had good rating in other aspects such 
as reuse, accuracy, and intention to use. All the participants stated emphatically that 
they would use the tool.  
 In the free comments feedback section of the questionnaire, the participants 
revealed a positive general perception of the tool as potentially viable to support 
security requirements specification, and admitted their willingness to use it. Most 
agreed that the tool is easy to use, and capable of assisting the analyst. A few of them 
were particularly impressed that the tool enabled them to write security requirements 
that they did not think about initially until when they saw the suggestions from the 
tool. They all agreed that although the tool offers useful support for security 
requirements specification, it cannot be solely relied upon. This is because there were 
occasions when the tool failed to suggest certain expected options. Some of them 
advised that the tool would perform better if the quality of the underlying ontology is 
improved. They also mentioned a number of areas that should be improved in the 
tool. This includes the fact that 1) the tool’s interface did not scale well on the MacOs 
systems compared to Windows; and 2) the need to be able to save the requirements 
that pertain to a TMUC all at once in the repository and not one at a time. We agree 
with the observations of the participants and would seek to revise the subsequent 
version of the tool based on the observations by participants. 
Generally, the result of the first evaluation demonstrates the potential of the tool to 
first, simplify, and significantly aid the analyst during the security requirements 
specification process, particularly when the analyst is not highly experienced.  
                                                           
4 https://www.idi.ntnu.no/~wande 
5 https://www.idi.ntnu.no/~wande/Guide_for_Reqsec_Tool.htm 
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Second, facilitate a reduction in the effort expended on security requirements 
specification, particularly as the process progresses. Third, ensure that correct terms 
of the domain are used when formulating SR, and in a consistent way, thus reducing 
ambiguity. However, our inspection of the specified security requirements revealed 
consistency in the use of language and pattern of expression in formulated SR that 
pertain to same security threat scenario by different individuals, which is mainly due 
to the use of boilerplates and ontologies. 
 
Metric Mean Std 
PU 3 0.433013 
PEOU 3.714286 0.698638 
ITU 3.357143 0.481039 
Reu 3.214286 0.393398 
Acc 3.285714 0.95119 
Sere 4 0.816497 
Table 1: Mean score rating for Tool Assessment 
4.2  Expert Assessment of Quality of SR 
The second phase of the evaluation involved the use of experienced requirements 
analysts to assess the quality of the SR specified by the subjects used for the first 
phase of evaluation. The assessment was based on ten desirable requirements quality 
metrics [Stokes, 1991; IEEE Std. 98], which are defined as follows [Wilson 97]:  
i) Complete - the requirements specification precisely define all real world 
situations that will be encountered, and the capability to respond to 
them. 
ii)  Consistent - there is no conflict between individual requirement statements, 
that define the behaviour of essential capabilities; and specified 
behavioural properties and constraints do not have a negative impact on 
that behaviour. 
iii) Correct - the requirements specification accurately and precisely identify the 
individual conditions and limitations of all situations that the desired 
capability will encounter, and it defines what should be the proper 
response to those situations. 
iv) Modifiable - the requirements specifications is able to identify related 
concerns and grouped them together, while the unrelated concerns have 
been separated. 
 Testable - the requirements are stated precisely, such that a pass/fail or 
quantitative assessment criteria can be derived to validate their correct 
Implementation.  
Traceable - each statement of requirements has a unique identification that 
makes it easy to trace them subsequently. 
v) Unambiguous: the requirement statements are not subject to multiple 
interpretations. 
vi) Understandable: the language used to specify the requirements are simple, 
concise and easy to understand.  
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vii) Valid - all the stakeholders  would  be able to understand, analyze and accept 
or approve the requirements 
viii)  Verifiable - there is high possibility that requirement specifications at the 
current level of abstraction will be consistent with those at another level 
of abstraction 
4.2.1 Evaluation Procedure 
We collated the requirements specified by the seven participants for the four problem 
scenarios during the first evaluation into four single lists of merged requirements – a 
list for each problem scenario - ensuring that cases of exactly duplicated requirements 
do not exist. The summary of the collated requirements is shown in Table 2. The 
experienced analysts were then requested to assess the quality of the four sets of 
requirements along the ten requirements quality dimensions using a questionnaire that 
is based on the 5-point Likert scale. The mean score out of a maximum of 5.0 for each 
of the ten dimensions for the four sets of requirements (R1-R4) are shown in Tables 3 
and 4. 
 
 Security Problem Scenario Description Total number of 
merged 
requirements  
1. Automatic Traffic Control System 
(ATC) – R1 
Fabrication of false 
clearance 
12 
2. Electronic Passport System (EPS) – 
R2 
Identity theft of card 
owner 
12 
3. Network Security Bridge  (NSB) – 
R3 
Hacking of network 
host system 
26 
4. Database Tampering (DAT) – R4 Manipulation of web 
query. 
19 
Table 2: Summary of Collated Requirements 
4.2.2 Results 
The outcome of the assessment of the quality of SR by the experts revealed that the 
specified SR had above average rating in terms of their completeness, consistency, 
modifiability, testability, traceability, lack of ambiguity, understandability, and 
validity attributes. The SR got relatively higher rating in terms of completeness and 
consistency. The SR got below average ratings in the aspect of correctness, and 
verifiability. In the free comments feedback section of the questionnaire, the experts 
also reviewed many of the specified SR to make them less ambiguous and more 
understandable.  
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R1: ATC R2: EPS R3: NSB R4: DAT 
mean std mean std mean std mean std 
Complete 3 1 3 1 3.3 1.155 3 1 
Consistent 4 1 4 1 4 1 3.67 1.155 
Correct 2.3 0.577 2 1 2.67 0.577 2.67 0.577 
Modifiable 2.67 0.577 2.67 0.577 3.3 0.577 3 1 
Testable 2.67 2.081 2.67 2.081 3.3 1.527 3 1.732 
Traceable 4.3 1.155 4 1.732 4.3 1.155 4 1.732 
Unambiguous 2.33 1.155 2.3 0.577 3 1 2.67 0.577 
Understandab
le 3 1.732 2.3 1.527 2.3 1.527 3 1.732 
Valid 2.67 1.155 2.67 1.155 2.3 1.5275 2.67 1.155 
Verifiable 2.3 1.155 2 1 2 1 2.3 1 
Table 3: Mean score rating of Specified SR quality by Experts 
Mean R1- R4 
Complete 3.075 
Consistent 3.917 
Correct 2.41 
Modifiable 2.91 
Testable 2.91 
Traceable 4.15 
Unambiguous 2.58 
Understandab
le 
2.65 
Valid 2.58 
Verifiable 2.15 
Table 4: Global Mean score rating of Specified SR quality by Experts 
The result of the second evaluation suggests that the tool-based semantic 
framework is not only usable to support security requirements specification but can 
also facilitate improvement in many of aspects of security requirements quality.  
Generally, the result confirms the potential relevance of the tool-based framework to 
complement an inexperienced analyst during security requirements specification.  We 
can also conjecture that the low rating of specified SR in terms of correctness, and 
verifiability is due more to the competence level of the subjects used in the 
experiment and not necessarily due to a deficiency in the tool-based framework.  For 
example, we observed that although most of the SR that were specified by 
participants by using the tool were syntactically and semantically correct as far as the 
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domain vocabulary is concerned, the experienced requirements analysts still gave a 
low rating to many of the specified SR in terms of correctness. This means there are 
other implicit considerations for correctness known to the experts that were not 
obvious to the less experienced participants. Hence, there is a probability that a more 
experienced analyst would be able to specify SR of higher quality in terms of 
correctness, and verifiability by using the tool. 
4.2 Lessons Learned 
Our experience from the first phase of evaluation emphasised the need for high 
quality underlying ontologies – BTO, DO - and the boilerplate repository. Hence, an 
upfront and crucial investment is to ensure that good quality BTO, DO and a rich 
boilerplate repository are available at the onset of the tool. In order to cater to this, the 
tool comes pre-loaded with the BTO and the boilerplate repository as basic artefacts, 
while a DO can be imported into the tool. Also, provision was made to ensure the 
evolution of the BTO, DO, and boilerplate repository with time. To do this, we have 
made it possible to continually revise the ontologies BTO, DO, and boilerplate 
repository from within the tool’s environment. The tool includes an ontology 
management module that allows the addition of new concepts, properties, and axioms 
to an existing ontology, while the boilerplate management module allows the 
boilerplate repository to be updated. Thus, the tool can be customised, and adapted to 
cater for future emerging requirements.  
Also, from the second phase of evaluation, it was evident that although the tool-
based framework offer a good starting point for specifying SR, inspection of specified 
SR by more experienced personnel will be crucial to further improve quality of SR. 
Hence, the tool-based framework will provide optimal value when integrated into 
existing security requirements engineering (SRE) frameworks. 
4.3  Evaluation Threats 
Ordinarily, an industrial case study would give a different perspective to the 
evaluation of the tool and the quality of tool support. However, the subjects used for 
the controlled experiment during the first phase of evaluation are sufficiently 
knowledgeable in the relevant areas such as requirements engineering, system 
security, ontologies, and requirements boilerplates having taken taught courses in 
these areas. This makes them suitable as reasonable substitutes for real experts in a 
preliminary evaluation [Runeson 03].  Also, the evaluation was performed with only 
seven users, but although the statistical significance is reduced, the results are 
indicative of the acceptance of the approach evaluated. Moreover, our objective is to 
assess the potential usability of the tool to support security requirements specification. 
Evidence in literature suggests that a minimum of 5 subjects are sufficient to get a 
valid opinion on the usability of a tool [27].  
Also, a concern could be that if the second phase of evaluation had been 
performed with a more number of experts, who have a more diverse background, the 
result could be different.  We consider that the three experts used for the second 
evaluation, have the required experience and competence to give an unbiased and 
valid opinion on the quality of SR. The involved persons have a minimum of doctoral 
degree in software engineering, with diverse background in security requirements 
engineering research and practices. They also belong to different research institutions 
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and from two countries. So, while we currently see no reason to invalidate the 
observations of the three experts used to evaluate the quality of specified SR, an 
interesting point for further research is to have a wider group of experts to assess the 
quality of SR specified by the tool.  
Another perspective to the evaluation could be to evaluate the tool alongside 
other requirements management tools (e.g. Doors) not specifically focussed on 
security, and then see which groups are able to come up with the most and best 
security requirements for a certain problem within a given time limit. Another 
alternative is to compare the performance of two groups of users – one using the tool 
to formulate requirements, and the other group using largely a manual approach to 
document requirements, but supported by MS Excel. Many in the industry use Excel 
to document requirements where the human has to fully write the requirements from 
scratch, and Excel used only to support plain editing, storage, retrieval, and possibly 
automated numbering of requirements. Either of this form of evaluation could also 
lead to a different result compared to what we have reported. However, comparative 
evaluation with other tools is not attractive as at now because, hardly could we find 
any other tool that have the same focus, and is set out to do exactly a similar thing as 
we envisioned. The option to compare the tool’s performance relative to using MS 
Excel by two user groups is a possibility for the future, after this preliminary 
evaluation. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have presented the notion of semantic-based support for security 
requirements specification. Our approach employs a tool-based framework that uses a 
combination of ontologies and boilerplates to aid a requirements analyst in the 
process of security threat identification and eventual formulation of quality SR. It 
provides the attendant benefits of reducing the effort needed for the security 
requirements specification process, and offers a good starting point in cases when 
sufficiently experienced requirements analyst may not be available. The preliminary 
evaluation of the approach confirms that it is viable and usable for supporting security 
requirements specification, and that the specified SR have a generally acceptable  
rating in most aspects of the ten requirements quality dimensions used for evaluation. 
In future work, we will conduct a more elaborate evaluation by using industrial case 
studies to further validate the approach. Also, we shall seek means to further improve 
the performance of the tool, and extend the concepts to the aspect of safety.  
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